Is it possible to be optimistic about deep disagreements?

Abstract

In this paper, we explore some difficulties involved in adopting an optimistic stance toward deep disagreements. The optimistic view holds that such disagreements can be resolved rationally, whereas the pessimistic perspective argues otherwise. However, one of the main controversies concerning the origin of deep disagreements, found in Wittgenstein’s On Certainty (1969), lies precisely in the exact nature of foundational propositions, or hinge certainties. In this context, we argue that each author's interpretation of the possibility of rational resolution of deep disagreements depends directly on their conception of the nature of hinge certainties. We show that non-epistemic interpretations of hinge certainties tend to align with a broadly pessimistic view regarding the resolvability of deep disagreements. Although many Wittgenstein-based interpretations lean toward pessimism, we argue that it is possible to adopt an optimistic perspective. Here, we defend the possibility of a moderate optimism grounded in sensitivity to the interlocutor's frame of reference. In other words, we demonstrate—through practical examples—that a special openness to the interlocutor’s worldview, values, and assumptions leads to the potential resolution of deep disagreements.